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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of a managerial input that experiences increasing compensation along with 
decreasing intensity. We call this type of input a "Kiffin good" after the head football coach Lane Kiffin. We propose a 
novel production process that might lead to Kiffin behavior.
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     1. Introduction
A Gien good, or, more precisely, Gien behavior, occurs when an individ-
ual's quantity demanded increases when the good's price rises. The existence
of Gien behavior has been conrmed in laboratories using, for example,
rats.1 In this paper we explore the possibility of a similar, counterintuitive
correlation on the supply side of the market. In particular, we examine the
potential for a Kin good, which we dene as an input whose compensation
increases at the same time that its productivity falls in some sense. The
purpose of this paper is to formalize this notion and establish a setting in
which such a phenomenon can take place.
The term "Kin good" was prompted by the defection of head football
coach Lane Kin from the University of Tennessee to the University of South-
ern California. In short, it was an opportunity too good to pass up.2 The
ensuing model, however, is interesting on its own. A prot-maximizing rm
hires both labor and management. Labor is paid the market wage, while
management's pay is determined by bargaining. What makes the model
special is that instead of choosing labor, management chooses the shape of
the production function by choosing the intensity of management in produc-
tion. The production function is also aected by the talent of the employed
labor.
When worker talent increases, such as one achieves by moving to a foot-
ball program with better players, the increase may crowd out the manager's
intensity. If the decline in intensity is small enough that it does not outweigh
the impact on production of the increased worker talent, total output still
rises, and the manager's pay rises along with it. This is a Kin good, with
the manager's increased compensation accompanied by decreased intensity.
2. The model
Consider the following novel production process. A rm hires both labor `
and management k.3 Conditional on k, the production process is given by
1But not, unfortunately, for weasels. See Battalio et al. (1991) for an experiment in
which rats increase their consumption of quinine when its price rises, and DeGrandpre et
al. (1993) for an experiment in which smokers increase their purchases of a brand when
its price rises.
2Presumably, Coach Kin can relate to this.




where a > 0 captures the talent level of the workforce, 0 < i < 1 is referred
to as the manager's intensity, and k > 1. Unlike most production problems
where i is xed and k and ` are variable, we allow management to choose its
own intensity level i after the rm chooses k and `. As with the management
input, the rm's selection of the labor input is assumed to be non-strategic
to avoid a more complicated leader-follower type two-stage model.
The payment to the manager is determined by a simple contract that
divides the prots equally between the rm and the management. Conse-








where w is the wage, g(a)c(i) is the cost of intensity, and p is the price of
output.
The idea behind the function g(a) is that higher values of a correspond to
higher-quality labor or a more demanding work environment, and it may be
more or less dicult to maintain intensity when a increases. We know that
g(a) > 0, but its slope is open for debate. We assume that the cost function
c(i) is increasing and suciently convex for the second-order condition for a
maximum to be satised. Within this framework we can formally dene a
Kin good.
Denition 1 Management is a Kin good if its compensation increases si-
multaneously with a reduction in intensity.
The task for this paper is to nd conditions under which a Kin good
exists. To do this we will explore how management's behavior and compen-
sation change as the talent level of its work force increases. The manager's
4We treat k as exogenous throughout this paper. There are two reasons. One is that
the structure we impose on the rm's decision problem is not suciently rich to analyze
its choice of k because, in particular, we do not allow its costs to be convex in k. The
other is that we are more concerned with the manager's behavior than the rm's. The
primary issue with this assumption is that a rm with a dierent value of a might choose
a dierent value of k, which would then impact the overall sign of di=da, which is our
derivative of interest. However, holding k xed even though a changes is consistent with
a rm hiring an intact management team away from another rm.




i lnk   g(a)c
0(i) = 0: (1)
























The denominator is negative by the SOC for a maximum, and the numerator
is positive if g0(a) < 0, that is, if it is easier to maintain intensity in a higher-
expectation environment. Under both of these conditions, di=da > 0 and
there is no crowding out. But, if g0 is suciently positive, so that moving to
a better environment makes it much more costly to maintain intensity, then
there is crowding out.
Now nd how pay changes with a. Recall that pay is 1
2 [paki   w`], which












Note that the rst term is positive, and that the second term has the same
sign as di=da. Consequently, if di=da is positive the world is as it should be,
with increased compensation accompanying increased intensity. Our main
result follows from the above equation and the following denition.








The basic transmission lane behind a Kin good is the following. When
the input moves to a more demanding environment its marginal productivity
rises, ceteris paribus, because it works with more productive labor. However,
the move also increases the cost of maintaining intensity, and the Kin good
responds by reducing its intensity, thereby reducing its productivity. If the
5For simplicity, we set f(`) = 1.
3impact of the better environment on marginal product outweighs the impact
of the decline in intensity, the Kin good's compensation rises at the same
time that its intensity falls. Essentially, an input is a Kin good when work
force talent crowds out intensity but not so much that it negates the positive
impact of the talent.
3. Existence
An empirical exercise into the existence of a Kin good would be both obvi-
ous and largely unproductive.6 In this section we provide an example which
ts the conditions of Proposition 1. First, in order for di=da to be negative
its numerator must be negative:
pk
i lnk   2g
0(a)c
0(i) < 0:






In other words, any cost function g(a) for which the marginal cost exceeds






































6At the University of Tennessee, Coach Kin made $2 million for his rst (and only)
year. After nishing the season with a mediocre win-loss record of 7-6 and a bowl game
loss, Coach Kin defected to the University of Southern California, where he is now
making $4 million a year.
7Note that we use e  2:7 units of the Kin good which is slightly more than reality.












indicating a maximum. It remains to show that di=da is not too negative so
















so that this is a Kin good.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the possibility of Kin behavior, wherein a man-
ager's compensation increases as his intensity decreases. We propose a novel
production process, and then provide a simple numerical example showing
that Kin behavior is indeed possible. While we focus on Coach Kin's
move to the University of Southern California, Kin behavior can also be
used to explain, for example, why a sports team suddenly improves when a
star player is injured because his teammates \step up."
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